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...there is a source of gain from cooperative activity involving working as a
team, wherein individual cooperating inputs do not yield identifiable, separate
products which can be summed to measure the total output.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
1 Introduction
Thewhole economics is built up over discussion of collaboration of groups of people, start-
ing fromAdam Smith andWalrasian equilibria. Many human activities improve from col-
laboration. Even writing papers in Economics together is often much more efficient and
fun than writing them by oneself. But it is very infrequent that a certain activity requires
the participation of the whole human population, for almost every aim a finite group suf-
fices. Every organization that tried to organize the population of even one entire country
for a single endeavour has failed so far. So what determines the size of the productive
establishment? When do the gains from cooperative activity balance out the costs of over-
crowding?
We propose a model of team production that demonstrates that the answer critically
depends on the properties of the production function in a very specificway. The important
interaction is whether the returns to scale in teamwork efficiency, a measure of compara-
tive efficiency between a team of workers and one worker, is at match with the marginal
productivity of the production function, which transforms aggregated effort into output.
We distinguish the motivations of the team, where agents make decisions about their ef-
fort choice independently, and the firm, where the effort level is set by the optimal contract
written by the residual claimant of profits.1 We attempt to make as little assumptions on
the shape of production functions as possible, but even with a few assumptions we estab-
lish many interesting observations:
1The general term for both of these organizations is the establishment.
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• the firm thatmaximizes profitswill be larger than the non-profit firm thatmaximizes
the utility of workers;
• the firm does not have to be larger or smaller than the team;
• the establishment that makes decisions about its size in general picks the size that
does not maximize the effort of members;..
Weprovide framework inwhich one canmake judgements about the direction of change
in the establishment’s size due to change of the institutional organization based upon the
values of elasticities of certain functions, which can be recovered from the empirical ob-
servations. We demonstrate how closed-form solutions and seemingly natural assump-
tions, like constant elasticities, can provide qualitatively misleading results. Assumption
of a constant elasticity of something is a natural thing to do in empirical framework when
estimating the production function. We show how constant elasticities rule out a lot of
economically significant behavior.
We assume away monitoring, transaction and management costs, direct and indirect,
to guarantee that our results are not driven by them. We believe they are an important
part of the reason why firms exist, but they are complementary to the forces we discuss,
and their effects have been extensively studied in the literature. Our point is that even in
the absence of these costs, there still might be a reason for cooperation.
We now review the relevant literature. In Section 2, we introduce the model, introduce
notation, solve for the effort choice in both the team and the firm, and discusse how to
identify the optimal size of the establishment. Finally, we conclude, and discuss mathe-
matical simplifications and potential extensions of the model.
1.1 Literature Review
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. Themoral hazard in teams literature
was introduced by Holmstrom (1982), who showed that provision of effort in teams will
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be generally suboptimal due to externalities in production and impossibility of monitor-
ing individual efforts perfectly. Legros and Matthews (1993) showed that the problem of
deviation from efficient level effort might be effectively mitigated if sharing rules are well-
designed. Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest peer pressure to mitigate the 1/N effect: the
increase of number of workers lowers the marginal payoff from higher effort. When the
firm is getting larger, they argue, the output is divided between larger quantity of workers,
while they bear the same individual costs. Hence, the effort of each worker should be de-
creasing as firms grow larger, and they were trying to compensate that decrease with peer
pressure. Adams (2006) showed that the 1/N effect may not occur if the efforts of workers
are complementary enough. Because he uses CES production function, the determinant
of sufficient complementarity is the value of the elasticity of substitution. We extend his
result into the domain of general production functions. Unfortunately, the direct result of
Adams (2006) model is that whenever 1/N effect is not observed, it either always makes
sense to invite more members into the team or to work alone; more discussion on that is
in the text. Because we drop the CES case, we are able to obtain conditions when there is
an optimal firm size for a general target function.
This allows us to contribute to the firm size literature, too. Theories of firm boundaries
are classified as technological, organizational and institutional (the classification is bor-
rowed from Kumar et al. (1999)). The technological theories explain the firm size by the
productive inputs, andways the valuable output is produced. Basically, there are five tech-
nological factors that are taken into account describing the firm size: market size, gains
from specialization, management control constraints, limited workers’ skills, loss of coor-
dination. For example, Adam Smith explained the firm size by benefits from specializa-
tion limited by the market size. By his logic, workers can specialize and invest in narrower
scope of skills, hence economizing on the costs of skills. Becker and Murphy (1992) focus
on the tradeoff between specialization and coordination costs. The larger is the firm, the
larger are the costs of management to put them together to produce the valuable output.
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Williamson (1971), Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Rosen (1982) use loss of control for
explaining firm size. Williamson points out that a size of hierarchical organization may
be limited by loss of control, assuming the intentions of managers are not fully transmit-
ted downwards from layer to layer. Calvo and Wellisz (1978) show that the effect of the
problem is largely dependent on the structure of monitoring. If the workers do not know
when the monitoring occurs, the loss of control doesn’t hinder the firm size, while it may
if the monitoring is scheduled. Rosen (1982) highlights the tradeoff between increasing
returns to scale in management and the loss of control. As highly qualified managers fos-
ter the productivity of their workers, managers with higher abilities should have larger
firms firm. However, the attention of managers is limited, hence having too much work-
ers results in loss of control and decreases the productivity of their team substantially. The
optimal firm size in this model is when the value produced by the newworker is less than
the losses due to attention diverted from his teammates.
In this literature, Kremer (1993) is the paper closest to ours, because this is one paper
that obtains the optimal size of the firm based solely on the firm’s production function.
This paper focuses on the tradeoff between specialization and probability of failure as-
sociated with low skill of workers. He assumes that the the value of output is directly
proportional to the number of tasks needed to produce it. Larger number of workers and
hence tasks tackled allows to produce more valuable output, but each additional worker
is a source of risk of spoiling the whole product. Hence, the size of the firm is explained
by the probability of failure by the workers which is proportional their skill.
Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) analyze a problem similar to ours. In this paper, agents
play an aggregate game, where the payoff of each agent is a function only of the agent
himself and of the aggregate of the actions of all other agents. In our game, we allow gen-
eral interactions, but under certain assumptions we can summarize these interactions in a
similar way, which does not make our game aggregate. Also, Acemoglu and Jensen (2013)
study comparative statics for this general class of games, whereas we consider how the
game outcomes change under different assumptions about establishment size formation.
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2 The Model
In this part, wewill introduce themodel of endogenous effort choice by the teammembers
as a reaction to the team’s composition. We will define the equilibrium, determine how
the amount of effort responds to the change in N , and finally we will try to see how to
study changes in different maximands with the change in N .
The team of size N conducts production as a outcome of a single-period simultane-
ous move game. Team members contribute non-contractible effort. Efforts {e1, ..., eN} are
transformed into aggregated effort by the effort aggregator function:
g(e1, ..., eN |N), (1)
where g(·|N) changes with N . The aggregated effort is then used for production via pro-
duction function f(·).
The product is split in equal proportions among teammembers. Exercising effort low-
ers the teammember’s utility by the effort cost c(e). Obviously, the choice of effort depends
upon other members’ effort choice. The worker’s problem is therefore to choose effort e to
maximize
u(e|e2, ..., eN , N) = 1
N
f (g(e, e2, ..., eN |N))− c(e). (2)
The firm of size N , in line with the literature, acknowledges the strategic complemen-
tarities between workers’ efforts, and provides each worker with a contract that makes
this worker implement the first best. We assume that the residual claimant collects all the
surplus; results do not change if the residual claimant only collects a fixed proportion of
the surplus. Workers face the same effort aggregator function and production function.
AssumptionsWe introduce a number of assumptions in order to obtain useful charac-
terizations.
Assumption 1. g(·|N) is symmetric in ei, differentiable, strictly increasing in each argument,
concave in one’s own effort, and homogenous of degree 1. g(1|1) = 1.
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This assumption states that the identities of workers do not matter, only the amount
of effort does. We will be using this assumption extensively, since we will be considering
symmetric equilibria. Homogeneity of degree of exactly 1 is not very restrictive: if one has
g(·) which is homothetic of degree γ, one can use g˜(·) = g(·)1/γ and f˜(x) = f(xγ) which
has the same composition, but g˜(·) is homogenous degree 1.
One of the consequences of this assumption is that g′1(e1, e2, .., eN |N) is homogenous
degree 0. This, in turn, implies that in a symmetric outcome
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) + g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) + ...+ g′′1N(e, e, .., e|N) = 0⇔
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) = −(N − 1)g′′1i(e, e, .., e|N) ∀i ∈ {2..N},
which by concavity in own effort means that in symmetric outcomes others’ efforts are
strategic complementarities.
Assumption 2. f(·) is strictly increasing and differentiable degree 2.
This is a technical assumption on the production function. We do not require for now
that f(·) has decreasing returns to scale.
Assumption 3. c(·) is increasing, concave, c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
This immediately implies that a positive amount of effort is exerted by any teammem-
ber, since f(g(·)) is assumed to be strictly increasing at zero.
Example 1. (based on Adams, 2006) Let g(e1, .., eN |N) =
(∑N
i=1 e
ρ
i
)1/ρ
, f(x) = xα and c(x)
increasing, twice differentiable and concave. Therefore, agent 1 problem is
max
e1
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)α/ρ
− c(e1),
which, assuming a symmetric outcome, produces e1 = ...eN = e∗(N) = z(N
α−2ρ
ρ ), where z(x) is
the inverse of the marginal costs of effort c′(x), an increasing function. Hence, e∗(N) is increasing
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in N if and only if ρ ∈ (0, α/2), and this implies that the effort aggregator needs to be closer to
Cobb-Douglas case to have effort increasing in the team size.
One can see that even for a nice aggregation function like CES it is hard to rule out
the case when there is no well-defined argmaxN e∗(N), and this is even harder for other
maximands, like the utility of a representative agent. This is against data: most firms
have no trouble choosing the optimal firm size, whatever is the maximand. In order to
understand better what kind of function can deliver nontrivial predictions, we need to
characterize the changes in e∗(N). First-order condition of the worker’s problem is
f ′(g(e1, ..eN)|N))g′1(e1, .., eN |N)/N − c′(e1) = 0, (3)
and solving the first-order condition is sufficient to solve for the maximum when
f ′′(g(e1, ..eN)|N))(g′1(e1, .., eN |N))2/N + f ′(g(e1, ..eN)|N))g′′1(e1, .., eN |N)/N
−c′′(e1) < 0 (4)
for every {e2, ...eN}. Define εq(x) = q′(x)x/q(x), the elasticity of q(·) with respect to x. By
dividing the second-order condition by the first-order condition and multiplying by e1,
with a slight abuse of notation one can obtain
εf ′(g(e1, ..eN |N))εg(e1, ..eN |N) +
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e1, .., eN |N)−εc′(e1) < 0, (5)
which will hold if and only if (4) holds.
Assumption 4. (4) holds for every {e1, .., eN} for every N .
This holds when f(·) features decreasing returns to scale, and the aggregator function
g(·) is concave in each argument. Alternatively, one can require that c(·) is concave enough.
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2.1 Team Choice: Equilibrium Outcome
The equilibrium is a collection of efforts of agents e∗1, ..e∗N such that each worker i solves
his problem (2) subject to treating efforts of other peers as given:
e∗i = argmaxe
1
N
f
(
g(e, e∗−i|N)
)− c(e),
where e∗−i denotes values of {e∗1, .., e∗N} omitting the value of e∗i .
Assumption 5. A unique symmetric equilibrium with nonzero efforts exists.
Denote e∗(N) the function that solves
f ′(g(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N))g′1(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)/N2 = c′(e∗(N)). (6)
Homogeneity degree 1 for g(·) helps us to study the behavior of e∗(N). Define
h(N) = g(1, .., 1|N).
This function represents the efficiency of coworking: howmuch more efficient is the team
of agents who exercise effort e than a single person that exercises effort e. Therefore we
will call it the teamwork efficiency function. For instance, if it is linear, team is as efficient as
the sum of its parts. By Euler’s rule and symmetry of g(·),
h(N) = (h(N)e)′e = (g(e, e, .., e|N))′e = g′1(e, .., e)+g′2(e, .., e)+..+g′N(e, .., e) = Ng1(e, .., , e|N).
Therefore, (6) can be rewritten as
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 = c′(e∗(N)). (7)
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The equation (7) is the incentive constraint that defines e∗(N) as a function of N . The
second-order condition of the agent’s problem at equilibrium level (5) can be rewritten as
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
1
N
+
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)−εc′(e∗(N)) < 0. (8)
This is because εg(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N) = (h(N)/N)e∗(N)e∗(N)h(N) = 1N . Let
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))− εc′(e∗(N)) < 0 (9)
hold; then (8) is satisfied automatically, whether εf ′(·) is negative or positive, since εc′(e∗(N)) >
0. Essentially, if c(x) is more convex than f(y) at every x and y, this condition is satisfied.
Similar math is used to compare risk-aversity of individuals: for every u(x), εu′(x) is just
the negative of Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
2.2 Firm Choice: First-Best
Following Holmstrom (1982), we assume that the firm supply their employees with con-
tracts that implement the first-best choice of effort. Individual effort choice does not take
into account complementarities in efforts. Omnipotent and omniscient social planner
would instead choose the effort size eP (N) by maximizing
max
e
1
N
f(g(e, e, .., e))− c(e),
getting the first-order condition
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N)). (10)
The solution of (10), eP (N), is higher than the solution of (7), e∗(N), since we assumed
that the solution of (7) is unique. The reason is that in equilibrium themarginal payoffs are
multiplied by 1/N again, because agents fail to take into account complementarities. Even
10
if the product f(·) were not split N ways, but instead were non-rivalrous,2 the problem of
additional 1/N in the choice of equilibrium effort will persist.
The second-order condition is
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))h2(N)/N − c′′(eP (N)) < 0,
which, after dividing by the first-order condition, can be rewritten as
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N))− εc′(eP (N)) < 0. (11)
Observe that it is very similar to (9).
Result 1. If εf ′(x) is decreasing, εf ′(x) < εc′(x) and h(N) ≥ 1, (9) and (11) are satisfied.
εf ′(x) being decreasing has the following interpretation. When εf ′(x) is constant and
equal to α, it means that f ′(x) = Kxα + C, which makes f(x) a power function unless
α = −1, in which case f ′(x) = K lnx + C, where K and C are integration constants. The
decreasing εf ′(x) implies “lower power”, or ”more concavity” of f(·) at larger arguments.
2.3 The Optimal Size of the Establishment
Mathematically, the problem of the optimal firm size with distinct nonatomary agents
is precisely in the discreteness of the firm size. However, using homogeneity and the
function h(N), we alleviated this mathematical problem. With differentiable h(N), we
can take derivatives with respect to N , and expect e∗(N) and eP (N) defined with (7) and
(10) to be continuous and differentiable.
In order to conduct the comparative statics with respect to N , we will apply the usual
implicit function apparatus. For now, h(N) has been only defined for N ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}.
2For non-rivalrous goods, consumption by one agent does not prevent or worsen the consumption of
the same unit of good by another agent. Think of coauthoring the paper: the fact of eventual publication
contributes to both authors in a similar amount as if there was only one author. At least in opinion of some
tenure committees.
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With a heroic leap of faith, we extend the definition of h(N) to real positive semi-axis. We
postpone the discussion of how to choose a continuous h(N) if one only observes g(·).3
After characterizing the choice of effort by the establishment of size N , we can char-
acterize the consequences of various firm organization models on its hiring policy. We
will assume that for our maximizers the problem is single-peaked, that is, there is a unique
interior maximum point, the derivative of every problem’s Lagrangean is strictly positive
below that point, and strictly negative above that point.
Team Size That Maximizes Effort
In this subsection, we will introduce the apparatus we use to make statements about the
optimal size of the establishment. This subsection is crucial to understanding the further
analysis. We therefore keep the analysis in this part very explicit. Other problems will be
dealt with in a similar fashion, therefore we move out the repetitive parts to Appendix.
From (7) one can deduce e∗(N), well-defined over N ∈ R+, continuous and differen-
tiable.
Problem 1. Characterize N that maximizes e∗(N).
LetN1 be the solution of this problem. Take elasticities with respect toN on both sides
of (7) to get:
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) [εe∗(N) + εh(N)] + εh(N)− 2 = εc′(e∗(N))εe∗(N).
Solve this to obtain
εe∗(N) =
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1)− 2
εc′(e∗(N))− εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) . (12)
From (12) one can immediately see that the N that maximizes e∗(N) has to satisfy
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1) = 2. (13)
3For CES g(e1, .., eN |N) = (
∑
eρi )
1/ρ, h(N) = N1/ρ. This can easily be extended to positive non-integer
values of N . Something similar can be derived for many convenient function.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
(e∗(N))′ > 0
(e∗(N))′ < 0
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
(a) Choosing optimal N
εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
(e∗(N))′ > 0
(e∗(N))′ < 0
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
(b) ... with costlier effort
Figure 1: Choosing N to maximize effort in a team
Let εc′(e∗(N))− εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) > 0, that is, let the cost function be convex enough4. Then
whenever εh(N) (εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) + 1) > 2, e∗(N) is increasing in N , and otherwise it is
decreasing in N .
Denote
Φ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 2.}
Solving out the equilibrium will produce a function e∗(N), and therefore a sequence of
values of (εh(N), εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)). We depict an example of this path on Figure 1. Denote
Γ1 = ((εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)))|Equation (7) holds).
For the sequence depicted on the graph, one can observe that e∗(N) is increasing atN ≤ 3,
and decreasing forN ≥ 4. Therefore, the optimal “continuous”N (denote itN1) is between
3 and 4, and the integer N that delivers the maximum effort is either 3 or 4.
The assumption that g(·) is CES makes εh(N) constant; the assumption that f ′(·) is a
power function makes εf (·) constant. Example 1 predicts that whether e′(N) is positive or
negative depends upon the elasticity of substitution of g(·) precisely because, in the world
of Adams (2006), f(x) = x and g(·) is CES. Therefore, in order to have a nontrivial pre-
diction about the optimal effort size, one needs either a decreasing εh(N), or a decreasing
4See discussion on p. 10 to see why assuming this is less restrictive than reverse.
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ε′f (e
∗(N)h(N)), or both. One, however, canmake predictions without knowing the precise
specification of the problem.
Result 2. When the solution to (13) is unique, an increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of effort
leads to an increase (decrease) in N1.
Example 2. (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, based on Lemma 2, p. 398) Let g(e1, ..eN |N) =
∑N
i=1 ei,
and let f(x) be concave, in addition to previous Assumptions. Then
h(N) = N ⇒ εh(N) = 1,
εf ′(x) =
f ′′(x)x
f ′(x)
< 0,
and therefore for every N (εh(N), εf ′(e∗(N)h(N))) < (1, 1). The individual effort decreases with
N for every N .
What conditions would guarantee that the optimal team size is not trivial and easy to
characterize?
• The one-person firmwould like to expand: (e∗(1))′N > 0. This, based on the Figure 1,
implies that h′(1) > 2
εf ′ (e∗(1))+1
, which is easy to verify when f(·) is a power function,
and somewhat harder to verify in general case.
• There is a single intersection of Γ1 and Φ1. Observe that the difference in choices of
h(·) holding g(·) fixed only changes the values of h′(·), and therefore does not affect
the values of εf ′ at integer N points.
Our results extend to the case when intersections are multiple in a way similar to the
way how comparative statics with multiple equilibria are treated. For brevity, we will
concentrate in the future on the case when the intersection of Φ1 and Γ1 is unique. It is
easier to hope for the existence of this intersectionwhen both εh(·) and εf ′(·) are decreasing
functions, which are convenient assumptions for some of the statements we’re going to
prove later.
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Firm Size That Maximizes Effort
Social planner takes into account the agents’ complementarities in g(·). Were social plan-
ner choosing effort for agents, his FOC suggests higher effort for each size of the firm (see
discussion of the 1/N effect on p. 10). Since c′(·) is increasing, this immediately implies
that eP (N) ≥ e∗(N), with equality atN = 1, and the effort-maximizing sizes of a firm and
a team do not have to coincide.
Problem 2. Characterize N that maximizes eP (N).
Let N2 be the solution to this problem. The first-order condition5 becomes
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
= 1. (14)
Again, if the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, the effort is increasing
in N , and the reverse holds when the left-hand side is smaller than 1. The change of the
first-order condition affects multiple components of the optimal size problem:
• The threshold that governs when the firm is big enough, Φ1, is now replaced by
Ψ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 1.}
The reason why 2 in the definition of Φ1 is replaced with 1 is exactly because 1/N
effect in the effort choice decision went away.
• Since the effort level increases for almost every level ofN , the values of ε′f (eP (N)h(N)) 6=
ε′f (e
∗(N)h(N)), unless f(·) is a power function in the relevant domain.
Figure 2 demonstrates the difference, assuming that ε′f (·) is a decreasing function.
Since h(N) did not changed, abscissae are the same for different values of N for both
Φ1 and Ψ1. One can see that two effects are at odds: since the efficiency frontier is fur-
ther away, larger firms become more efficient. However, the change in εf ′(·) due to higher
efforts for each firm size tend to lower the optimal firm size.
5See Appendix for derivation.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1Ψ1
(eP (N))′ > 0
(eP (N))′ < 0
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4N = 5
Figure 2: Choosing N to maximize effort, social planner case
Result 3. If εf ′(x) is constant or weakly increasing, choosing efforts according to the first best
would make the firms larger.
Proof. See Appendix.
Team Size That Maximizes Utility
Does it make sense to invite someone to join the team? If this increases the utility of other
team members, absolutely. Therefore, the team size that maximizes the utility of a mem-
ber of the team is the team size that would emerge if teams were free to invite or expel
members.
Problem 3. Characterize N that maximizes 1
N
f(h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)).
Assume there is a unique N3 such that the utility of each member of the firm of that
size is maximal. It should solve
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
= 1. (15)
Again, at values of N where left-hand side is larger (smaller) than 1, the utility is in-
creasing (decreasing) in N. Let Φ2 be the set of locations where (15) holds with equality.
Plot this line evaluated at N = N1 over Γ1 and Φ1 on Figure 3.
One can immediately see that:
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: Below both graphs both efforts and profits increase as the size of the firm goes larger. Above both graphs both efforts and profits decrease withN . Between graphs, when
εh(N) < ε¯h , efforts decrease withN , but profits decrease; the reverse holds when εh(N) > ε¯h .
Figure 3: Choosing N to maximize individual utility
• There is a unique intersection of Φ1 and Φ2, and it happens at ε¯h = 1/εf (e(N1)h(N1)).
• The path of Γ1 intersects Φ1 above Φ1
⋂
Φ2 if and only if N1 < N3. In general, when
two different maximands are used, different answers are to be expected, but our
result makes issues clearer: the only thing necessary to establish whether N1 < N3
is the value of εh(N1) and εf (e∗(N1)h∗(N1)).
Result 4. If εf (x) is increasing (decreasing), εf ′(x) + 1 > (<) εf (x), and thereforeN3 > (<) N1.
Therefore, if the elasticity of f(·) at the teamster-chosen size of the firm is too small, it
is likely that the teamwill be too large to implement high efforts. For instance, in teaching,
many lecturers assign home assignments for group work. Some lecturers use fixed group
sizes, other lecturers allow students to form groups of their choosing. If higher effort is
desirable (for instance, because effort in classroom is valuable on the labor market, which
is not fully understood by students), it might be a good idea to restrict the group size,
against complaints of students. If the elasticity of f(·) at N1 is larger than εf ′(·) + 1 at the
same N1, students will yearn for increase of the size of the group, and they will complain
that the required group size is too large otherwise.
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First-best Firm Size
What size of the firm makes the most efficient use of human resources? This could be a
problem of employee-owned firm, where the residual claimant collects 0 profit at the end
of the day, and is only necessary to punish deviators via optimal contracts.
Problem 4. Characterize N that maximizes 1
N
f(h(N)eP (N))− c(eP (N)).
Let N4 solve this problem. At N4,
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N) = 1 (16)
holds (see Appendix for derivation). When εf (eP (N)h(N))εh(N) > 1, the utility of each
member of the firm is increasing with the size of the firm, and the utility is decreasing
otherwise.
One can see the difference of (14) and (16): they have to be equal only when ∀x, εf (x) =
εf ′(x) + 1, which implies that f(x) is the power function.
Result 5. If εf (x) is larger (smaller) than εf ′(x) + 1, N4 is larger (smaller) than N2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This Result helps to establish why are people not working efficiently in different envi-
ronments. The problem is not so much in the returns to scale of the production function,
the relevant threshold is the comparison of the first and of the second derivative of the
production function. Those employee-owned companies, whose employees feel that they
would be more motivated and would work harder had they had more collaborators, have
εf (e
P (N)h(N)) < εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1, their production function is locally more concave
than the power function.
Profit-Maximizing Firm Size
Holmstrom (1982), inter alia, argues that corporate firms have a competitive edge over
self-governed firms because corporate firms can implement the first-best level of output.
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Under no uncertainty, the firm can collect the whole surplus. The behavior of firm is not
different if for some reason (bargaining, etc) it collects a constant positive fraction of the
profits. Let the firm owner collect the surplus of N workers.
Problem 5. Characterize N that maximizes N
(
1
N
f(eP (N)h(N))− c(eP (N))).
The equation that determines N5, the profit-maximizing firm size, is
εc(e
P (N))εh(N) = 1. (17)
As usual, when the left-hand side is larger than 1, the profit increases with adding an extra
employee, and the reverse is true too. See Appendix for details of derivation.
Result 6. When solutions to (16) and (17) are unique, N5 ≥ N4.
Proof. See Appendix.
Whenever a company goes from employee-owned to public, it should increase in size,
which neither improves its efficiency nor makes employees happier.
Example 3. Let f(x) = xα and c(e) = eβ . Let β > α > 0, then relevant Assumptions and (9) is
satisfied. For general but convenient h(·), the first-best eP (N) chosen by the firm satisfies
α(eP (N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N
= β(eP (N))β−1 ⇒
eP (N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α +
α
β − α lnh(N)−
1
β − α lnN
]
.
The effort size e∗(N) chosen by the members of the team satisfies
α(e∗(N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N2
= β(e∗(N))β−1 ⇒
e∗(N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α +
α
β − α lnh(N)−
2
β − α lnN
]
.
Then, if εh(N) is a decreasing function, and it’s value at N = 1 is high enough,
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1. N1, that maximizes the effort size when the effort level is chosen simultaneously and inde-
pendently, satisfies εh(N1) = 2/α;
2. N2, that maximizes the effort size when the effort level is chosen according to the first best,
satisfies εh(N2) = 1/α;
3. N3, that maximizes the team member’s utility when the effort level is chosen simultaneously
and independently, solves εh(N) = 2(N−1)Nβ−α , right-hand size of which is monotone, less than
2/α, and converges to 2/β from below.
4. N4, that maximizes the payoff per worker when the effort level is chosen according to the first
best, satisfies εh(N4) = 1/α;
5. N5, that maximizes the firm’s profit when the effort level is chosen according to the first best,
satisfies εh(N5) = 1/β.
Example 3 supplies the following intuition for comparing the outcomes of different
maximands:
1 & 2 Larger firm sizes maximize the efforts when effort levels are chosen centrally rather
than individually. This is a consequence of having f(·) being a power function (see
Result 3), and does not have to hold in general.
1 & 3 The team size chosen by the team when the effort level is chosen individually is
smaller than the team size chosen to maximize the effort size. This is a consequence
of a strong connection between εf (·) = α and εf ′(·) = α − 1. Compare (7) and (15):
when N is such that (7) is satisfied, (15) suggests that the utility of each participant
would go up if the size of the team went down.
2 & 4 The size of the firm that maximizes employees’ utilities is maximizing their effort as
well. This is not a general result, but a direct consequence of f(x) = xα: conditions
(10) and (20) coincide algebraically.
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3 & 4 When a self-organized teambecomes incorporated, itmight become larger or smaller.
If 2α < β, then the incorporated firm becomes smaller than the team. Otherwise,
the firm can become larger, but only when N3 > 1/(2− β/α).
3 & 5 Comparing 2(N−1)
Nβ−α and
1
β
is equivalent to comparing N and 2− α
β
, which means that
if self-organized team has at least 2 members, the incorporated firm with the same
production function will employ more people.
4 & 5 Firm that maximizes the total profit hires more workers than the firm maximizing
the utility of its workers (see Result 6).
This exercise demonstrates many spurious findings arising simply from the desire of
closed form solutions. Some of the findings are generalizable, but most are a consequence
of the power function assumptions.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we stepped away from the common assumptions about production functions
to study effects of scale on the optimal size of an establishment from many perspectives.
Our contribution is to circumvent the inherent discontinuity in hiring when complemen-
tarities are important. We found that in order to decide on whether incorporation of a
partnership, or going from private to public, will lead to hiring or firing, and whether
employers’s effort with be suffering from overcrowding or from insufficient specializa-
tion. We found that teams do not have to be larger or smaller than firms under same
production function. We found that, under very specific assumptions, employment by a
profit-maximizing capitalist will lead to larger firm size than employment by employee-
owned firm. The analytic framework we suggest is very general, and can be modified to
include uncertainty, non-trivial wage schedules, profit-splitting schemes from cooperative
game theory like the Shapley value. We conclude with the discussion of two potentially
important areas of application and extension of our model.
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3.1 The Choice of h(·)
Obviously, in one knows f(·), h(·), and c(·), analysis above can be conducted. However,
h(N) is not fundamental, at least not in non-integer values. It suffices to know h(N) to eval-
uate e∗, eP , εf , εf ′ and εc at integer Ns. The optimum characterizations, however, depend
upon h′(N) as well. h′(N) values at non-integer points would suffice, since optimization
requires checking whether the value of the elasticity of h(·) is above or below a certain
threshold. How can one choose the value of h′(N) at integer points if one only knows
h(N) at integer points? Obviously, arbitrary choices of h′(N) can position the points all
over the space of (εh, εf ′). We suggest imposing a refinement over the possible derivatives
of h(N):
h′(N) ∈ [min(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1)),max(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1))] .
(18)
To connect integer points, assume that between two neighboring integerN , h′(N) is mono-
tone. This implies that extrema of h(N) are only at integer points. Obviously, this pre-
serves concavity, convexity and monotonicity, had h(N) defined over integers had these
properties. This limitation helps a lot in characterizing the optimal paths. Consider Fig-
ure 4, which is similar to Figure 3, but instead of points along the path of Γ1, we plot sets
for every value of εf ′(e∗(N)h(N)) that is consistent with some value of h′(N) restricted by
(18) at integer values, and then imposemonotonicity for h(·) across the path to connect the
integer values. On Figure 4, one can see that the intersection with Φ1 happens between
N = 3 andN = 4, whereas for Φ2 intersection with Γ1 happens betweenN = 4 andN = 5.
Therefore, for f(·) and g(·) behind Figure 4, the self-organizing teamwill be weakly larger
than necessary to maximize efforts.
The reverse problem of obtaining g(·) if knows h(·) but not g(·) is surprisingly easy.
Result 7. For every h(N),
g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N) (e1e2...eN)1/N
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: The solid lines represent the possible values for the path Γ1 at integerNs under the restriction of (18). Shaded region represent possible places for the path of Γ1 over
non-integer values ofN . Arrows follow a sample path.
Figure 4: Team choosing optimal N
and
g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N)/N1/ρ
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)1/ρ
for ρ < 1 have properties necessary to apply the analysis above.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result emphasizes the comparative importance ofh(N) over the cross-complementarities
in g(·): many different g(·) functions can supply mathematically identical h(N) functions.
The marginal effects of effort complementarity are less important than scale effects of
teamwork. This, of course, is a consequence of constant returns to scale of g(·).
3.2 Heterogeneity of Agents
Homogeneity of degree 1 restricts us significantly in our analysis: we need to employ
identical employees. With a certain sophistication of mathematical apparatus, this can be
amended. In this subsection, we will introduce two types of agents: working agents have
positive but finite effort costs, whereas shirking agents do not work at all6. Consider a team
6This could be because of inability to perform, or because of freeriding.
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that consists of N1 working agents and N0 shirking-type agents. Its production is
f (g (e∗(N1, N0), .., e∗(N1, N0), 0, .., 0|N1 +N0)) ,
where e∗(·) solves
e∗(N1, N0) = arg max
e
1
N1 +N0
f (g (e, e−1|N1 +N0))− c(e),
Let
h(N1, N0) = g(1, 1, .., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1 times
, 0, 0, .., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N0 times
).
Then the first-order conditions of working agents is:
1
N1 +N0
f ′(e∗(N1, N0)h(N1, N0))h(N1, N0)/N1 = c′(e).
Whether this team should hire an extra person depends upon the production function.
What happens to effort if one more person is hired? Let εh1(N1, N0) denote the elasticity
of h with respect to N1, and εh0(N1, N0) denote the elasticity with respect to N0; interpret
εe1 and εe0 similarly. One then can obtain
εe1(N1, N0) =
(εf ′(e
∗(N1, N0)h(N1, N0)) + 1)εh1(N1, N0)− (1 + N1N1+N0 )
εc′(e∗(N1, N0))− εf ′(e∗(N1, N0)h(N1, N0)) ,
εe0(N1, N0) =
(εf ′(e
∗(N1, N0)h(N1, N0)) + 1)εh0(N1, N0)− (1− N1N1+N0 )
εc′(e∗(N1, N0))− εf ′(e∗(N1, N0)h(N1, N0)) .
Particularly, at the team size that maximizes effort, εh1(N1, N0) =
(
2N1
N0
+ 1
)
εh0(N1, N0). If
a shirking person does not benefit the production (dh(N1,N0)
dN0
= 0), adding an extra shirking
agentwill lower the effort by eachworking agent precisely because this will lower the share
of output coming towards both working and shirking agents. If however shirking agents
improve the productivity of other agents (say, by bringing working agents coffee), there
might be a positive share of shirking agents in order to induce better effort from working
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agents. In fact, εh1(N1, N0) = (2N1N0 + 1)εh0(N1, N0) implies
dh(N1, N0)
dN1
N1
h(N1, N0)
= (2
N1
N0
+1)
dh(N1, N0)
dN0
N0
h(N1, N0)
⇒ dh(N1, N0)
dN1
= (2+N0/N1)
dh(N1, N0)
dN0
.
(19)
That is, themarginal teamwork efficiency fromadding an extraworkingmember should
be at least twice as high as the marginal teamwork efficiency from adding a shirking
worker. If there’s more working agents than shirking agents, and the decisions of hir-
ing and firing are conducted by voting, under perfect information working agents might
be interested in voting out shirking agents. If, however, there’s more shirking agents than
working agents, working agents will not be able to get rid of the freeriding shirking agents.
In the world with imperfect information, the detection of who is shirking is likely to be in-
efficient and costly, and therefore we should expect both types of agents in the team. The
sequential hiring and firing can lead to different outcomes with respect to N1 and N0 (if,
for instance, h(N1, N0) is homogenous degree 0), and therefore can produce variance in
the optimal firm size.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Solution of Problem 1 in text, on page 12.
Solution of Problem 2 To choose the firm size that maximizes the level of effort, take the
derivative of both sides of
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N))
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with respect to N . The values of N where (eP (N))′ = 0 will be the one we are looking for.
The derivative looks like
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′+h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N+f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N−h(N)/N2] =
= c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′.
Divide by the first-order condition to obtain
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′ + h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N + f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N − h(N)/N2]
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N
=
=
c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′
c′(eP (N))
.
Rearrange to obtain[
c′′(eP (N))eP (N)
c′(eP (N))
− f
′′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)eP (N)
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
(eP (N))′N
eP (N)
=
h′(N)N
h(N)
[
1 +
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
−1.
Rewrite:
εeP (N) =
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)− 1
εc′(eP (N))− εf ′(eP (N)h(N)) .
When εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
> 1, effort increases with the size of team, and effort
decreases otherwise.
Solution of Problem 3 To choose the team size that maximizes utility, solve
max
N
1
N
f (h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)),
where e∗(N) is such that (7) holds. The first-order condition is:
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N−f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2−c′(e∗(N))(e∗(N))′ <> 0,
with a> sign when the utility of each teammember is increasing in the membership size,
with a <when the utility of each member is decreasing in the membership size, and with
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equality at optimum. Substitute (7):
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N − f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 −(
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2
)
(e∗(N))′ <> 0.
Group variables and divide by f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 > 0 to obtain
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))(e∗(N)h(N))
f(e∗(N)h(N))
(
e∗(N)h′(N)N + (e∗(N))′h(N)(N − 1)
(e∗(N)h(N))
)
− 1 <> 0,
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
− 1 <> 0.
Solution of Problem 4 To maximize the utility of each member of the team when their
effort is imposed to deliver the first best outcome, the size of the firm should be chosen to
solve
max
N
f(eP (N)h(N))
1
N
− c(eP (N)),
subject to (10). The first-order condition of this problem is
f ′(f(eP (N)h(N)))[eP (N)h′(N)+h(N)(eP (N))′]
1
N
− 1
N2
f(eP (N)h(N))−c′(eP (N))(eP (N))′ <> 0.
Divide by f(eP (N)h(N))/N2 and rearrange to obtain
1
f(eP (N)h(N))/N2
(
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N)− 1
)
<> 0. (20)
Solutionof Problem 5Let the firmcollect the surplus ofN workers. The profit-maximizing
firm owner who uses contracts that implement the first-best effort will therefore solve
max
N
f(g(eP (N), .., eP (N)|N)−Nc(eP (N)) = N
(
1
N
f(eP (N)h(N))− c(eP (N))
)
,
which has a first-order condition with respect to N of
f ′(eP (N)h(N))[eP (N)h′(N) + (eP (N))′h(N)]− c(eP (N))−Nc′(eP (N))(eP (N))′ = 0.
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Applying (10), the definition of eP (N), this can be simplified to
f ′(eP (N)h(N))eP (N)h′(N) = c(eP (N)).
Applying (10) again to replace f ′(·) with a function of c′(·), one can get
c′(eP (N)h(N))
N
h(N)
eP (N)h′(N) = c(eP (N))⇒ εc(eP (N))εh(N) = 1.
Proof of Result 1. For every level of effort e,
εf ′(eh(N)) < εf ′(e)εc′(e).
Using the effort levels implied by either equilibrium outcome or first best completes the
proof.
Lemma 1. Len e˜(N) > e(N). If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing (increasing), the effort-maximizing
team size under e˜(N) is lower (higher) than the effort maximizing team size for e(N).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let N1 and N˜1 be solutions to team effort maximizing problems with
effort functions e(N) and e˜(N) respectively.If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing, since e˜(N) <
e˜(N)
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 ≥ εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e˜(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
Since we assumed that the problem is single-peaked, this implies that the effort is increas-
ing with N for e(N) at N = N˜1, or that N1 > N˜1. The result for increasing εf ′(·) is proven
similarly.
Proof of Result 2. Suppose the marginal costs decrease to c˜′(x) ≤ c′(x) for any x. Consider
symmetric equilibrium efforts e(N) for the initial problem and c(·) costs, and e˜(N) under
modified costs c˜(·). By necessary conditions e(N) and e˜(N) solve (6) with marginal cost
functions c˜′(x) and c′(x) respectively. Therefore,
f ′(e(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e(N)) ≥ 0 = f ′(e˜(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e˜(N)).
This, combined with second order conditions and single crossing, implies e˜′(N) ≥ e(N).
Applying Lemma 1, we obtain the result.
Proof of Result 3. Let N˜1 solve
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e
P (N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
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Then N˜1 ≤ N2 by single-peakedness assumption for Problem 1. Moreover, by Lemma 1,
N˜1 ≥ N1 as eP (N) ≥ e∗(N) for each N . Hence, N2 ≥ N˜1 ≥ N1.
Proof of Result 4. Observe that
(εf (x))
′ = (εf ′(x) + 1− εf (x)) εf (x)
x
.
Since f(·) is an increasing function, the first part of the statement is proven. The second
part of the statement follows immediately from evaluating (15) at N1.
Proof of Result 5. εf (x) ≥ εf ′(x) + 1 means
εf (e
P (N2)h(N2))εh(N)− 1 ≥ (εf ′(eP (N2)h(N2)) + 1)εh(N)− 1 = 0
Workers’ utility increases at N2, hence by single-peakedness assumption N2 ≤ N4.
Proof of Result 6. Observe that since the effort choice maximizes the payoff of an agent in
a single-peaked problem, the payoff of an agent is positive at every N :
1
N
f(eP (N)h(N)) > c(eP (N)).
The first-order condition (10) is 1
N
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N) = c′(eP (N)). Divide the FOC by the
inequality above:
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)
f(eP (N)h(N))
<
c′(eP (N))
c(eP (N))
.
Multiply both parts of inequality by eP (N) > 0:
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)eP (N)
f(eP (N)h(N))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εf (eP (N)h(N))
<
c′(eP (N))eP (N)
c(eP (N))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εc(eP (N))
.
Now, consider (17). At N5, it holds with equality. Inequality above implies that at N5
εf (e
P (N5)h(N5))εh(N) is less than 1. Therefore, the firm that maximizes the utility of its
employees would rather lower the size of the firm, meaning that N4 < N5.
Proof of Result 7. It is straightforward to see that, for g(e1, ..eN) = h(N)(e1e2...eN)1/N , one
immediately obtains
g(1, 1, .., 1|N) = h(N)(1× 1× 1× ..× 1)1/N = h(N),
and homogeneity degree 1 is trivial. Since the function is Cobb-Douglas conditional on
N , g′i(·|N) = 1N g(·|N)ei > 0 and g′′ii = −N−1N2
g(·|N)
e2i
< 0. Therefore, Assumption 1 is satisfied.
The CES case is proven similarly.
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